Court name
Supreme Court of Turks and Caicos Islands
Case number
G-CL 3 of 2020

Roberto Ricardo Robinson v. The Attorney General (G-CL 3 of 2020) [2021] TCASC 7 (12 March 2021);

Law report citations
Media neutral citation
[2021] TCASC 7
Case summary:

Mr Robinson, the Plaintiff, is charged with the offences of robbery and conspiracy to rob. An originating summons was issued on his behalf seeking an inquiry into whether the police officers who arrested him breached ss 5(4) and 5(5) of the 2011 Constitution by failing to inform him of his right to remain silent as well as his right to have one person informed by the quickest practicable means of his arrest and of his whereabouts, before taking his caution statement in which Mr Robinson admitted the commission of the offences.

Headnote and holding:

The Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under ss 5(4) and 5(5) of the Constitution were not violated and the originating summons is dismissed. No order made as to costs. 

From the evidence, Mr Robinson was informed that he was being investigated for Robbery. He was then informed of his right to an attorney, as well as a right to have other persons present.  He was told he had a right to keep silent, and also the consequences of not doing so, which was, that if he chose to say anything, it might be used against him (para 18) Charles v. Crown Prosecution Service [2009] EWHC 3521 (Admin) [CONSIDERED] 

Mr Skippings’ argument on behalf of the Plaintiff that, under s 5(4) of the Constitution, the Police were required to inform Mr Robinson that he was entitled to an attorney at public expense is untenable as there is no suggestion in s 5(4) that upon arrest, there is guaranteed the right to representation at the public expense. There is currently no legal aid scheme for persons arrested or detained at the police station (paras 27-33). 

Mr Skippings’ argument that the police interpreter provided was not independent is artificial as, from the evidence, there was no complaint that the use of the interpreter adversely affected the Plaintiff (paras 34-35). 

The Court found that Ms Gardiner’s argument on behalf of the Attorney General that the relevance of Mr Robinson’s evidence is paramount, must take a back seat to the protection of a constitutional right which is aimed at ensuring fairness in proceedings (paras 37-39) Kuruma v. The Queen [1955] AC 197 per Lord Goddard at p 203 [CONSIDERED]; Charles v. Crown Prosecution Service [2009] EWHC 3521 (Admin) per Moses LJ at para 11 [APPLIED]. 

Coram
Agyemang, CJ

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS

 

ACTION NO. G-CL 3/2020

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ROBERTO RICARDO ROBINSON BY MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL TURKS & CAICOS ISLANDS POLICE FORCE

 

BETWEEN:

 

ROBERTO RICARDO ROBINSON

PLAINTIFF

AND

 

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

(in a representative capacity for officers of the Royal Turks & Caicos Islands Police Force)

DEFENDANT

                                                                                                               

CORAM: AGYEMANG CJ

 

MR. NOEL T. SKIPPINGS FOR THE PLAINTIFF

MS. DOMINIQUE GARDINER CROWN COUNSEL FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

 

 

HEARD ON 22ND FEBRUARY 2021

 

HANDED DOWN ON 12TH MARCH 2021

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

1.By an originating summons, the plaintiff, charged with the offences of Robbery and Conspiracy to Rob, for which he is committed to stand trial at the Supreme Court, seeks the following, being, an inquiry into:

“1. Whether on the true construction of the 2011 Constitution of the Turks & Caicos Islands, and the events which happened at the Police Station in Providenciales on the 19th of December, 2019, 20th December, 2019, and 21st December, 2019 concerning the giving and taking of the Caution Statement and an Interview, the Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated.

2. That if the answer to the question 1 above is in the affirmative the court may so far as is necessary give directions as to the declaration of the violation of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights…”

 

2. The matters informing this constitutional motion arise from events that occurred on the 19th until the 21st of December 2019. More particularly, on the night of the 19th of December 2019, police officers, having been alerted of a robbery at a place called Jimmy’s Dive Bar, Leeward Highway, Providenciales, went to the scene of the crime. After a search in the vicinity, they arrested the plaintiff. An investigation was conducted into the case, and the plaintiff was charged with the offences of Conspiracy to Rob, and Robbery, for which he is now standing trial.

 

3. It is the case of the plaintiff that his constitutional right to a fair hearing was infringed, when police officers in breach of sections 5(4) and 5(5) of the 2011 Constitution, allegedly failed to inform him - before he volunteered a caution statement by which he admitted the commission of the offences - of his right to remain silent, as well as his right to have one person informed by the quickest practicable means of his arrest and of his whereabouts. He alleges that the said lapses denied him the right to remain silent, and further, deprived him of advice he may have received from friends or relations, to keep him silent.

 

4. These alleged violations, he claims, were in breach of constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual and led to his providing statements to the Police which he now considers to be prejudicial to his case.

 

5, In his affidavit filed in support of the originating summons, the plaintiff also seeks an order excluding the statements and audio/video evidence he gave to the Police, from the Prosecution's evidence, as they are extremely prejudicial to his case.

 

ARGUMENTS FOR THE PLAINTIFF

6.  In support of these matters, learned counsel for the plaintiff makes two arguments:

The first is that in breach of section 5(4) of the 2011 Constitution, the police neglected to inform the plaintiff that he was entitled to the services of an attorney at the public expense if he could not afford the services of an attorney.

In this regard, learned counsel contends that had the police informed the plaintiff of these rights, he might have opted for an attorney. It is his argument that not being gainfully employed at the time, it was natural for the plaintiff to refuse the offer to engage an attorney whose services he knew he could not afford.

The second alleged breach, he states, was the neglect of the police officers to inform the plaintiff that he was entitled to have “one person informed by the quickest practicable means of his arrest and his whereabouts," as provided in section 5(5) of the Constitution. In this regard he alleges that although the defendant was told of his right to remain silent, he was not told of his right to have someone informed of his whereabouts until the day after his arrest, on 20th December 2019. He submits that such a person may have advised the defendant to remain silent.

 

7. It is also the contention of learned counsel, that the caution that was administered by the police to the defendant was improper, and in breach of the provisions of the Constitution, in that it was administered in an interview, and not in respect of a statement. Relying on the case of Charles v. Crown Prosecution Service [2009] EWHC 3521 (Admin), learned counsel submits that it was improper to merge the taking of a caution statement with an interview, and that the alleged impropriety affected the validity of the statement thus procured. Thus does he canvass that the statement provided by the plaintiff in the alleged circumstances in which constitutional provisions were allegedly breached, be disallowed in the trial.

 

8. In support of both alleged breaches (5(4) and 5(5) of the Constitution), learned counsel cites the case of Whiteman v. The Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (1991) UKPC 16 to assert that the plaintiff who was allegedly not informed of his right to counsel, and of the right to any person of his choice, was denied constitutional rights which were fundamental rights.

 

DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE

9. The defendant has denied the basis upon which this suit has been brought, and alleges the following: that the plaintiff was in fact informed of his right to remain silent, his right to an attorney, or to have a friend or relation to be present, but that he refused all three.

 

10. Giving the version of events on behalf of the defendant, Detective Police Constable Jervon Hall, a Police investigator who with another police officer, took the cautioned statement of the plaintiff, recounts the following: that on Thursday 19th December 2019, the plaintiff was apprehended in the vicinity of, and in connection with a robbery that was reported by the owner of a place called Jimmy’s Dive Bar, in which two males robbed the barmaid of $711.00 at gun point. Upon his arrest, the plaintiff allegedly offered to tell the police what had happened. With that indication, the arresting officer who had already cautioned him, handed him over to officers of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) Office for his statement to be taken. The deponent alleges that because the plaintiff was found to be a native Spanish-speaker, a veteran Police interpreter was brought to the CID, to interpret to the plaintiff, from English to Spanish, and then from Spanish to English to the investigator. Before the plaintiff’s statement was taken, he was allegedly cautioned in this manner: he was informed of his right to remain silent, and told the consequences of a decision to talk to the Police which was, that anything he said may be used in evidence. He was also asked if he wished to have an attorney, or to have a member of his family or a friend present. The plaintiff allegedly declined to have an attorney or have any such person present, but went ahead to speak to the police, volunteering a statement which was recorded on video and audio equipment with his knowledge.

 

11. In the statement, he admitted to committing the robbery with another. After the statement, he signed the audio/video recording. The plaintiff was subsequently charged with the offences of robbery and conspiracy to rob. After he was charged, he was placed before the court for a sufficiency hearing which found a prima face case regarding the commission of the offence. This led to the plaintiff’s committal for trial, due to begin on 12th April 2021.

 

12. The defendant asserts that not only is there no factual basis for this suit, but that no substantive legal submissions have been made.

 

13. To demonstrate that sections 5(4) and 5(5) of the Constitution were not breached when the police officers took a cautioned statement in which the plaintiff confessed to the commission of the crime, and also to demonstrate the voluntary manner in which the plaintiff gave the statement, the defendant has reproduced the official record of what happened at the Police Station on 20th December. I reproduce it as follows:

 

“Interviewer: The reason why you are here is that on Thursday 19th of December 2019 sometime after 10pm a robbery report was made to the Police which had occurred at Jimmy's Dive Bar at Leeward Highway Providenciales you were later apprehended in the immediate facility, fitting the description of one of the robbers. The Police is carrying out investigation into the matter and believe that you can assist. Do you understand?

Interviewee: Yes

Interviewer: You are not obligated to say anything unless you wish to do so but whatever you say would be video and audio recorded and given in evidence. Do you understand?

Interviewee: Yes I understand

Interviewer: You have the rights during this caution statement to have present with you an attorney at law, a friend or family member if you wish. Do you need anyone here?

Interviewee: No

Interviewer: It is our intention to audio and video record this caution statement where you will have an opportunity to tell us what happen. Do you understand?

Interviewee: Yes

Interviewer: Alright, did anyone force you to give this caution statement?

Interviewee: Nobody

Interviewer: Did anyone promise you to give this caution statement?

Interviewee: No

Interviewer: Did anyone threaten you to give this caution statement?

Interviewee: No

Interviewer: Did anyone promise you anything to give this caution statement?

Interviewee: No”

 

DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS

14. In the submission of learned counsel for the defendant, this suit has been brought to invalidate a confession made by the plaintiff by reason of the alleged non-compliance of the police officers with their constitutional duty to inform the plaintiff of his right to remain silent, a matter that is denied. She submits that the paramount question to be answered, is whether there is a risk of an unfair trial if the statement and audio are included in the prosecutor's evidence. This she denies. She further submits that in the event that this court finds that the appropriate procedures were not followed in obtaining the statements from the applicant, this would not per se, render the statements inadmissible. Citing the celebrated dictum of Lord Goddard C.J. in Kuruma v. The Queen [1955] AC 197 at p.203, she urges the court to apply the test of ‘relevancy to matters in issue’, in considering whether the plaintiff’s confession statement given to the police and which is challenged in this suit, is admissible. She urges the court to disregard the circumstances in which it was taken once it passes the relevancy test. In this regard, she submits that the evidence (the plaintiff’s confession) can directly prove the facts in issue, and is therefore relevant and admissible in proceedings. It is for these reasons that she urges the court to take into consideration the probative value of the confession statement which was given voluntarily and has passed the sufficiency test, as well as the possible prejudice to the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest, especially in the light of the prevalence of gun-related crimes and the offence of robbery, to hold it admissible.

 

ISSUES

15. Having regard to the evidence adduced, and the arguments raised by counsel for both sides, these issues arise for determination in this suit:

  1. Whether or not the statement of the plaintiff was taken without the proper caution.
  2. Whether or not the Police breached the constitutional duty of informing the plaintiff of his right to an attorney;
  3. Whether or not the fundamental human rights of the plaintiff were infringed;
  4. Whether or not the cautioned statement in which the plaintiff confessed to the commission of the crime should be excluded if his constitutional rights were infringed.

 

DISCUSSION

16. I reproduce the constitutional provisions in question:

 

Sections 5(4) and 5(5) of the 2011 Constitution of TCI:

“(4) Any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right, at any stage and at his or her own expense, to retain and instruct without delay a legal representative of his or her own choice, and to hold private communication with that representative, and in the case of a minor he or she shall also be afforded a reasonable opportunity for communication with his or her parent or legal guardian; but when the person arrested or detained is unable to retain a legal representative of his or her own choice or be represented by a legal representative at the public expense, he or she may be represented, and hold private communication with, such person as a court may approve.

 

(5) Every person who is arrested shall be informed, as soon as he or she is brought to a police station or other place of custody, of his or her rights under subsection (4); and he or she shall also have the right, and shall be informed at the same time that he or she has the right, to remain silent and to have one person informed by the quickest practicable means of his or her arrest and his or her whereabouts”

 

17. The first question raised in this suit is if the caution that was administered by the police on the 20th of December 2019 to the plaintiff, was in accordance with sections 5(4) and 5(5) of the Constitution?

 

18. It seems to me that it was. From the evidence, the plaintiff was informed of the crime being investigated and for which he had been arrested: robbery. He was then informed of his right to an attorney, as well as a right to have other persons present. He was told he had a right to keep silent, and also the consequences of not doing so, which was, that if he chose to say anything it might be used against him. The evidence before this court makes it abundantly clear, that contrary to the contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff, the plaintiff was left in no doubt that the interview was for the purpose of taking his caution statement. The interviewer went as far as to ensure that safeguards were in place in that the plaintiff had not received threats or promises or anything that might taint a possible confession.

 

19. In my judgment, this is not akin to the case of Charles cited for my persuasion, in which the Police were held to not have complied with provisions relating to caution, designed to protect detainees. That was a case in which an admission made in the course of a police interview that was conducted without a proper caution, and in clear breach of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and Codes of Practice Code C, was held to be inadmissible evidence, so that a conviction for driving with excess alcohol based upon it fell to be quashed.

 

20. It is not so in the present case.

 

21. In his affidavit in support of the present application, the plaintiff has alleged that two of his rights were violated, being his right to remain silent, and to have one person informed by the quickest practicable means of his or her arrest or whereabouts. The defendant has denied it, and has in support of its stance, reproduced a transcript of the interview of the plaintiff at the CID office following the plaintiff’s arrest that demonstrated the contrary. The excerpt of the transcript, which is an official record, has not been challenged by the plaintiff. The transcript will therefore be accepted as the true state of affairs regarding what occurred whilst the plaintiff was in custody. I reproduce once again, the relevant portions thereof:

 

“Interviewer: The reason why you are here is that on Thursday 19th of December 2019 sometime after 10 pm a robbery report was made to the Police which had occurred at Jimmy's Dive Bar at Leeward Highway Providenciales, you were later apprehended in the immediate facility, fitting the description of one of the robbers. The Police is carrying out investigation into the matter and believe that you can assist. Do you understand?

Interviewer: You are not obligated to say anything unless you wish to do so but whatever you say would be video and audio recorded and given in evidence. Do you understand?

Interviewee: Yes, I understand.

Interviewer: You have the right during this caution statement to have present with you an attorney at law, a friend or family member if you wish. Do you need anyone here?

Interviewee: No”

 

22. From the evidence, the arrest of the plaintiff was effected after the police were called onto the scene of the crime at about 10:18 pm of the 19th of December 2019. After the plaintiff’s arrest, an interview was conducted at the CID office, in which he gave his caution statement. The time of that interview was recorded to be 12:45 am of the 20th of December 2019. That would make it a few hours after the arrest. In that interview, as reproduced, the plaintiff was informed of his rights in accordance with sections 5(4) and 5(5) of the Constitution.  

 

23. Learned counsel for the defendant submits that the requirements of sections 5(4) and 5(5) were complied with, and therefore that there is no factual basis for the present application. I could not fault that argument. I say so because the evidence before the court shows that besides being informed of his right to an attorney, the plaintiff was also asked if he wished to have a friend or relation present before he gave his statement. He replied that he did not wish to have any such person. In my judgment, although what the Constitution provides is for the arrested person to be given the opportunity to call one person to inform the person of his arrest or whereabouts as soon as practicable after he is taken to a police station, the query of the police investigator regarding the plaintiff’s desire to have any such person present to which he responded ‘no’, was not so far off the mark as to be characterized as a failure to inform him of his right to inform one person of his arrest or whereabouts. My view is that while the investigator did not inform the plaintiff of his right to notify friends or relations of his plight or whereabouts, he did give the plaintiff the opportunity to make a request for someone to be brought to where he was. He turned down the offer. In my view, it therefore lies ill in the mouth of the plaintiff (as he deposes in his affidavit) to say that he was deprived of advice of any such person which might have persuaded him to keep silent. The facts do not bear out what he now alleges.

 

24. It has also been contended that although section 5(5) requires that the person arrested be informed of his rights under section 5(4), this was not done when the present plaintiff was arrested on the 19th of December, but the next day: the 20th of December. This allegation is belied by the matters already set out, that the plaintiff was in fact told of his rights in an interview held at 12:45 am, that is a few hours after the plaintiff’s arrest, which was after 10:18 pm on the 19th December, when the police arrived on the scene of the crime in the vicinity of which they found the plaintiff and arrested him. There does not seem to be the delay that the difference in dates: 19th and 20th, suggests, as the rights intended to be communicated were so done but a few hours after the arrest of the defendant, and not a whole day after it. Like the other matters set out as breaches, this allegation also does not appear to pass muster.

 

25. The circumstances under which the defendant gave his caution statement which turned out to be a confession, is markedly different from the circumstance in the Charles case cited by learned counsel for the defendant. In that case, the police, having arrested the defendant started an interview (which itself was improper because they had already informed that defendant that he would be charged), failed to inform him what offence he was being investigated for. Furthermore, in the middle of his statement, a switch was made in questioning, thus leaving him unable to tell the offence regarding which he was being investigated. The statement obtained was held on appeal to be inadmissible.

 

26. In this present case, as I have said before now, the constitutional breaches alleged have not been found to have factual basis. I could not agree more with Moses LJ, in the Charles case, when, speaking of the legislation which had been breached (the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, and the Code relating to caution), he stated that “the provisions are made to protect a detainee. They are important protections. They impose stringent disciplines upon the police as to how to behave. If they can secure a conviction in breach of those provisions, that is an important matter which undermines the protection of a detainee in the police station”. That is also my view regarding the protections contained in sections 5 of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the facts of this case do not bear out any breach of section 5(4) or 5(5) regarding the taking of the defendant’s caution statement and, the consequent infringement of the guaranteed right to a fair trial in that regard.

 

27. Learned counsel has also made this forceful argument: that in breach of section 5(4) of the Constitution, the police did not inform the plaintiff of his right to an attorney to be provided at public expense if he could not afford one. He surmises that with the assurance that he would not, as an unemployed man be responsible for the hire of the attorney’s services, the plaintiff would most probably have asked for an attorney at public expense.

 

28. In my judgment, this argument is untenable for the reason that learned counsel appears to misapprehend section 5(4) of the Constitution. The said provision reads: “ (4) Any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right, at any stage and at his or her own expense, to retain and instruct without delay a legal representative of his or her own choice, and to hold private communication with that representative, and in the case of a minor he or she shall also be afforded a reasonable opportunity for communication with his or her parent or legal guardian; but when the person arrested or detained is unable to retain a legal representative of his or her own choice or be represented by a legal representative at the public expense, he or she may be represented, and hold private communication with, such person as a court may approve.”(my emphasis)

 

29. It seems to me that upon a literal reading of section 5(4) of the Constitution, the rights guaranteed to a person arrested for the commission of a crime, regarding representation, are:

 

(a) The right to an attorney at his/her own expense, or if such is available, an attorney at public expense;

(b) The right to be represented by a person of whom the court will approve if neither an attorney at the arrested person’s own expense or the public expense is available.

 

30. I do not see in section 5(4) any suggestion that upon arrest, there is guaranteed the right to representation at the public expense, of which the Police must inform the arrested person.

 

31. In this country, there is at present no legal aid scheme for persons arrested for crimes or detained at the police station. In fact, a person’s entitlement to legal aid commences at the point when he is charged for an offence before the Supreme Court. S. 16 of the Supreme Court Ordinance which empowers the Chief Justice to make Rules for the “provision of legal aid at public expense for poor persons committed for trial before the [Supreme] Court on criminal charges” (my emphasis), does not cover persons who have been arrested, but have not been charged and committed for trial before the Supreme Court.

 

32. It may well be, that to meet the aspiration referred to obliquely in section 5(4) of the Constitution, [which is, legal aid for persons not yet committed for trial before the Supreme Court], an amendment to the Supreme Court Ordinance to enable such, to provide legal aid at the public expense to be given to persons arrested or detained at the police station, may yet happen.

 

33. At this time however, it remains an aspiration, and not a right, and the police did no wrong, did not breach the provision, and infringed no right when they did not inform the plaintiff of the non-existent right to an attorney at the police station at public expense.

 

34. I have also had regard to learned counsel’s submission that the interpreter used to interpret English to Spanish and then Spanish to English was not an independent one, but a Police interpreter. Opposing counsel has stated that the interpreter was in fact one who has carried out the task of interpreting for the police for about twenty years (the Police investigator puts it at eighteen years). It has not been contended that the interpretation affected the defendant adversely. Indeed, form the evidence, the interview of the 20th December 2019 clearly shows that the defendant started giving his statement, and then dispensed with the interpreter, alleging inaccurate interpretation, and then without any urging, proceeded to narrate what had occurred, in English, admitting the crime.

 

35. On the 21st of December 2019, another interview was conducted after another caution was administered. Following this interview, the defendant was charged with the offences.  These matters are set out in the unchallenged affidavit of Detective Police Constable Jervon Hall the Police investigator before whom the confession was made by the defendant. The caution statement and the interview of the next day have also been placed before this court. There does not appear to be any impropriety in there. Nor has the plaintiff made any complaint that the use of the interpreter caused him any trouble in his affidavit that provides the factual premise for the suit. In the circumstance, the arguments of learned counsel do not appear to be anchored on anything factual and appears to be an artificial one.

 

36. It seems to me that the arguments upon which learned counsel for the plaintiff has anchored his case which seeks to render the confession statement of the plaintiff inadmissible at his trial, have not been found to be tenable.

 

37. But I must comment on the defence put up by the defendant which was largely that if there was in fact a factual basis for the bringing of the application, in that the rights of the defendant set out in sections 5(4) and 5(4) of the Constitution, were infringed, that it should not matter any way because of the probative value of the evidence being called into question as well as the possible prejudice to the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest in the light of the prevalence of gun-related crimes and the offence of robbery. In her submission (citing Kuruma’s case), what is paramount is the relevancy of the evidence which was a confession voluntarily made, and not the mode by which it was obtained.

 

38. I have already indicated that I find no factual basis for the present suit, as the matters complained of as lacking in the police handling of the defendant were in fact, not lacking. In my judgment, the police complied with the sections 5(4) and 5(5) of the 2011 Constitution in the manner in which they dealt with the defendant, which led to the voluntary provision of a confession statement by the defendant. However, it will be remiss of me not to comment on the said defence by saying that a constitutional provision - especially one that enshrines the fundamental right of a person accused of the commission of an offence to a fair trial - is not cosmetic, but goes to the root of his trial.

 

39. Therefore, where there is a challenge to the performance of an official duty the breach of which infringes a constitutionally-guaranteed right, relevancy, as the requirement for admissibility, and even a high probative value, must take a back seat to the protection of the constitutional right which is aimed at ensuring the fairness of the proceedings. In this, I will echo Moses LJ’s pithy statement in Charles: “The sole reason they seem to have given relates to the fact that the confession was voluntary. That is by no means…dispositive”.

 

40. I recapitulate, that the matters of fact upon which the present application has been brought do not appear to be existent as the constitutional provisions said to have been breached: sections 5(4) and 5(5) of the 2011 Constitution, were in fact complied with by the police.

 

VERDICT

41. In answer to the question posed by this suit, I do say that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff enshrined in sections 5(4) and 5(5) of the 2011 Constitution of the Turks & Caicos Islands having regard to the events which happened at the Police Station in Providenciales on the 19th of December, 2019, 20th December, 2019, and 21st December, 2019 concerning the giving and taking of the caution statement and an interview.

 

42. The suit brought by the originating summons must therefore fail, and is accordingly dismissed.

 

COSTS

43. By reason of the indigence of the plaintiff, and the importance of the matters explored in this suit, there will be no order as to costs.

 

Sgd.

M.M. AGYEMANG

CHIEF JUSTICE